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r e sumen
Durante las últimas dos décadas, los economistas han desarrollado un 
mayor interés en la incorporación de las instituciones como una variable 
dentro de los modelos de crecimiento económico. Esta no es una tarea 
fácil. Es difícil generar los instrumentos que miden el desarrollo de las 
instituciones, las cuales se refieren a los diferentes problemas, tales como: 
inestabilidad política, el imperio de la ley, confianza, democracia y riesgo 
en los negocios.
El principal objetivo de este artículo es desarrollar un modelo de 
crecimiento para los países de América Latina, que no sólo incorpora las 
variables usuales, como la inversión, el capital humano, gasto público y 
comercio, sin que además, las variables puedan ser usadas como proxy 
de las instituciones para estos países, cubriendo el periodo de la segunda 
mitad del siglo XX. El énfasis está orientado a cuestiones empíricas antes 
que teóricas.
Los resultados muestran que las variables institucionales juegan un rol, 
pero debido a las limitaciones de los datos en el área de las variables no 
económicas y a la naturaleza de esta investigación, la evidencia es débil. Sin 
embargo, después de los años ochenta, parece haber evidencia empírica 
más fuerte sobre el rol de las variables no económicas en el crecimiento 
económico. El mérito de este trabajo es que es un intento inicial  por 
construir tales modelos basado en series de tiempo de corte transversal 
y aplicado únicamente a América Latina. Usualmente, la mayoría de los 
modelos vistos son regresiones de corte transversal entre países. Algunas 
técnicas, que fácilmente se aplican en las regresiones de corte transversal 
entre países, son más difíciles en datos de corte transversal y análisis de 
serie de tiempo.
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a b s t r ac t
During the last two decades, economists have developed more interest in 
incorporating institutions as a variable for economic growth models. Such 
a  task is not an easy one. It is hard to generate instruments that measure 
the development of institutions that are referred to different problems 
such as political instability, rule of law, trust, democracy, business risk 
and the like.
The main objective of this paper is to develop a growth-model for 
Latin American countries that incorporates not only the usual economic 
variables, such as investment, human capital, government expenditure 
and trade, but also variables that can be used as proxies of institutions for 
these countries, covering the period of the second half of the twentieth 
century. The emphasis is more oriented to empirical issues rather than 
theoretical ones.
The results show that the institutional variables do play a role, but 
due to limitations of the data base in the area of non-economic variables 
and the nature of this research, the evidence is somewhat weak. However, 
after the 80s, there seems to be stronger empirical evidence about the 
role of non-economic variables in economic growth.  One merit of this 
work is that it is an initial attempt to build such models based on pooled-
cross-time series and applied only to Latin America . Usually, most of the 
models we have seen are just cross-country regressions. Some techniques 
that are easily applied in cross-country regressions are more difficult in 
pooled and cross time series analysis.
K E Y  WO R D S : Colombia, growth, institutions.
J E L  C L A S S I F I C A T I O N : O43, O54.
I.  INTRODUCTION
During the last decade of the twentieth  century the interest in the 
role of institutions in economic development has increased due to 
several factors like the continuous deterioration of economic growth 
in many African countries, the problems faced by Eastern European 
countries in their transition from socialism to market economies, 
and the frustrations that such processes have implied regarding 
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the expectations at the beginning of the 90s and the slow-down of 
economic reforms in Latin American during the second half of the 
last decade as these countries experienced few positive results with 
the implementation of  such policies.
These realities have generated an increased interest in 
incorporating institutions as a variable in models of economic 
growth, although such task is not an easy one. To be sure, in order to 
include institutions in a model, it is necessary to design appropriate 
instruments that will allow us to measure the impact and evolution 
of different factors like political instability, rule of law, trust, business 
risk and the like.
Through this paper we take a first approach to such purpose 
and attempt to develop a growth-model for Latin American countries 
that incorporates not only the usual economic variables such as 
investment, human capital, government expenditure, and trade but 
also variables that can be used as proxies of institutions covering the 
period from 1951 to 1999.
The first section develops some theoretical considerations 
regarding the results that the current literature has registered for 
similar models that try to incorporate some institutional variables. 
However, the emphasis of this paper is more empirical than 
theoretical, and is oriented to underline the problems that arise 
from the estimation process.
In the second section we set up the model, define the variables 
and econometric procedures and techniques applied. Next, we 
devote some time to discuss the data, and how we used it, and 
elaborate on the adjustments we had to make, the difficulties we 
faced when solving some problems and also, the limitations of the 
scope of the model. We continue with an interpretation of the results 
and offer some conclusions at the end.
The results show that institutional variables do play a role, 
but because we were not able to get complete data bases in the 
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area of non-economic variables and the nature of this research, 
the evidence is still preliminary. Anyway, we claim that one of the 
merits of this work is that it is an initial attempt to build a model 
that incorporates institutions in its analysis applied with a particular 
focus on Latin America and that uses time series analysis. Usually, 
most of the models we have seen are just cross-country regressions1. 
Some techniques that are easily applied in cross-country regressions 
are more difficult in pool and cross time series analysis.
II. SOME THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Despite the new developments during the last twenty years 
incorporating the ideas of human capital, endogenous growth models 
and learning by doing approach2, current growth models are mainly 
based on the older neoclassical Solow-Swan model.  As Barro (1996, 
145) points out, “despite many breakthroughs ...the recent empirical 
work on growth across countries and regions has not received its 
main inspiration from new theories. Rather, the standard applied 
framework derives more from the older, neoclassical model, as 
extended to include…other variables” .
Through time, the concern for economic growth has pervaded 
through different economic theories. Classical economists revealed 
the link between economic growth and the distribution of surplus 
into profits and rents. For Karl Marx the rate of economic growth 
depended on a set of variables, especially the rate of profit. Post-
Keynesian economists underlined the role of the expansion of 
1  An exception to this assertion is the recent paper by  Kruzman, Ch., Werum, 
R. and Burkhart, R.(2002) that works with “core” and “non-core” countries 
though not referring to a specific region such as Latin America.
2  A complete review of the main standard neoclassical models by Solow and 
Swan can be seen in Barro, R. and Sala-I-Martin, X. (1998), chapters 1-2.
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demand as a main source of growth, underpinning processes of 
increasing returns of scale, cumulative processes and self-reinforcing 
mechanisms3.  Also, the idea of endogenous technological progress as 
an engine of economic growth is found in Smith, Marx, Schumpeter 
and Kaldor. Later, under a neoclassical perspective, Lucas and Romer 
would include the human capital approach.
However, from an empirical standpoint, most current models 
of growth have been based on the neoclassical approach built on the 
assumption of diminishing returns to capital. These models combine 
the standard variables with ideas of diffusion of technology, learning 
by doing and other issues. However, one of the main results of the 
standard neoclassical growth model always remains: the hypothesis 
of conditional convergence, which helps to explain the apparent 
irregularity of lack of correlation between economic growth rates 
and per-capita incomes of countries. Once the initial per-capita 
income for each country is taken into account, the results improve 
considerably regarding the significance of the main variables. The 
hypothesis of conditional convergence is referred to as a process 
of convergence to a specific long-run steady state for each country. 
(Barro 1997, 7-8).
Barro has explored the role of institutions worldwide in cross-
country analyses.  For example, he finds that measures of political 
instability “no longer affect growth significantly once an indicator 
of the security of property rights is held constant” (Barro, 1996b, 
146). In another study, he also points out that the maintenance of 
the rule of law, free markets, small government consumption and 
high human capital, seems to play an important role in economic 
growth (Barro 1996a, 23).
3  A brief summary of growth theories can be read on  O’Hara, Philip (1999), 
p.241-245. 
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However, despite the traditionally good results with the 
standard neoclassical growth model, some empirical evidence has 
been gathered to show that many poor countries do not seem to be 
catching up with other middle and high per capita income countries 
(Temple, 1999, 117)4.  For this reason, many scholars have started 
to focus their attention on the problem of the role of institutions in 
economic growth in order to determine if the “quality of public and 
private institutions, the particular structure of governance, and the 
extent of social capital (or civic engagement) affect growth” (Aron, 
2000, 99).
Though since the beginning of the twentieth century Original 
Institutional Economics (Veblen-Ayres-Commons’s tradition) insisted 
on the important role of institutions in economic performance, it is 
the New Institutional Economics (NIE) that has been more known for 
developments regarding this theoretical issue. The work of Douglass 
North has focused extensively on this subject (Libecap, 1990), 
where informal and formal rules seem to have played a crucial role 
in economic development as well as in the chronic backwardness 
of many countries5.
Recent works on economic growth and institutions show that 
one of the main problems is to find good proxies for the concept 
of institutions. To be sure, one has to be aware that such a complex 
concept is very difficult to reduce to some empirical indicators such 
as the positivist approach would demand. These quality measures for 
formal and informal institutions usually include respect for contracts, 
property rights, trust, and civil liberties. 
A good attempt was made recently by Hodgson (2006) 
studying the case of  transitional economies in Europe (1989-2005) 
4  This fact does not deny the hypothesis of conditional convergence, which refers 
to a different problem.
5  See also recent works by Rodrik (1999).
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from an institutionalist and evolutionary perspective showing that the 
degree of ethnic fractionalization, index of democracy and cultural 
factors such belonging or not to the zone of  Western Christendom 
seem to be more significant than others.
Although from different perspectives, several political and 
social databases have been constructed in the last decade to deal 
with this problem. However, when the researcher tries to work 
with long time series, only with some exceptions, she (he) is able 
to get information before the eighties.  Many indexes or qualitative 
measures created for this kind of variables still have problems even 
though they have improved considerably (Aron, 128-130). 
Despite these limitations, some solid results been obtained 
from numerous growth models built with institutional variables. 
For example, Mauro (1995) finds significant evidence of a negative 
correlation between corruption and investment, and is able to argue 
that bureaucratic efficiency seems to be an important determinant 
for investment and economic growth.  Knack (1996) finds that low-
quality institutions become a handicap for economy growth, even 
though some ‘backwardness’ could be beneficial at the beginning 
of the process of economic growth, when the nation has favorable 
institutions (Greece, Spain, and Ireland). In addition, Temple (1999) 
concludes that “democracies do not do noticeably better than 
autocratic regimes, but countries that extend economic freedoms 
and protect property rights grow faster” (152). Also, Borner et.al. 
(1995) state,  upon  reviewing sixteen empirical studies, that  only 
three found a positive association between democracy and economic 
growth, another  three uncovered a negative relationship, and the 
remaining ten had inconclusive findings. 
A quick review of the literature on the relationship between 
democracy and economic growth shows that there are several studies 
that consider how growth, or the lack thereof, affects the chances 
for democratization or democratic consolidation (Przeworski, 
et.al. 1996, Haggard and Kaufman 1997), but only recently there 
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are some studies that analyze the inverse relationship, this is, how 
democracy affects growth (Rodrik 2000, Gasiorowski 2000, Tavares 
and Wacziarg 2001, Bueno de Mesquita et.al. 2001). To be sure, in 
1990 Terry Lynn Karl called for reconsideration of the analysis by 
saying:
… [W]hat the literature has considered in the past to be the 
preconditions of democracy may be better conceived in the 
future as the outcomes of democracy. Patterns of greater 
economic growth and more equitable income distribution, 
higher levels of literacy and education, and increases in social 
communication and media exposure may be better treated as 
the products of stable democracies processes rather than as 
the prerequisites of its existence” ( p.5).
Other scholars have identified that a degree of wealth or 
capitalist development is required for democracy. In order for a 
country to institutionalize democratic procedures and behaviors, 
it is necessary for its economic performance to cross a threshold 
(Karl 1990, Przeworski et.al, 1996)) or as Lipset (1959) puts it, 
“the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will 
sustain democracy”. However, Lipset´s argument is turned around 
by O´Donnell (1973) and Huntington´s (1984) view,  that as 
economies become more complex, developed and influenced by 
foreign capital and technology, supported by low wages and low 
social investment, democratic processes and actors (i.e. trade unions 
and political parties), tend to be replaced by a professional military, 
and by technocrats and managers that assume the decision-making 
process.  
As we mentioned before, one of the main difficulties we found 
when creating a model that incorporates political institutions into the 
analysis is how to operationalize and measure democracy, and other 
political variables. In this matter, Bueno de Mesquita, et.al. (2001), 
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attempt to introduce two new concepts or institutions to identify 
political competition: electorate and winning coalitions. According 
to the authors, political competition generates economic growth but 
politicians are faced with a paradox as they have to decide between 
policies that benefit popular welfare and policies that will grant them 
more time in office6. The authors´ work attempts to develop a “theory 
that ties political incentives to the interest that leaders have in staying 
in office”, and they try to determine how political institutions affect 
decisions about government allocation of resources (58). 
Based on their study, Bueno de Mesquita et.al. (2001) reaffirm 
that economic growth is affected by the type of government a country 
has. They found that two countries that start at the same per-capita 
income in 1950 will have a very different per-capita income in 2000 
if they have different forms of government. The country with an 
autocracy will have a per-capita income of $1,200 while the one 
with a democracy or from a large coalition will have $4,480. They 
go even further by saying that if both countries remain with the same 
form of government until 2050, the gap will be wider: the country 
under an autocracy will have a per-capita income of $2,910 and the 
one with democracy will have $10,035 (65-66).
Similarly, Kurzman, Werum and Burkhart (2002) used a 
pooled annual time-series data from 1951-1980 for 106 countries, 
including 88 non-core countries, finding little or no direct effects 
of democracy on growth. However, positive indirect effects appear 
via investment (marginal but significant) and a robust effect via 
government expenditure, They, therefore, conclude that democracy 
does not hinder economic growth, and under some specific 
circumstances  seems to foster it.
6  Barbara Geedes refers to this as “The politicians Dilemma”.
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III.  THE MODEL
Most growth models are inspired by  a classical production function 
such as7:
Y =  A f (K, L, H)      (1)
Where Y =  Real output
A =index of technical efficiency
K = capital
L  =labor
H = Human capital
If we take logs and differentiate with respect to time, dividing 
both sides by Y, and defining the steady state for the model, we end 
up with the usual expression for all growth models:
y =  g ( investment coefficient, labor growth, human capital 
growth, growth residual)
Where y= real growth of output per capita. 
The estimations based on private investment coefficients, 
proxies for labor and human capital have been straightforward, but 
most of the discussion has centered on the residual, where we find 
a set of variables that incorporate technical change, political and 
social institutions and other variables. 
Taking into account the limitations on information we had, 
we defined the model as follows:
7  The following is a simplified version of the Mankiew-Roemer-Weil model. See 
Temple (1999, 122).
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RGDP
it 
  =β0+ β1 Iit  + β2 Git + β3OPENit  + β4 INFLATIONit 
+ β5 POPGROWTHit + β6 LRGPL50it + β7 LNSECEN60it 
+ β8 BLACKMPit + β9 DEMOCRACYit + β7 RIOTSit + β8  
CONSTCH
it  
+ ε
itit        
(3)
Where:
i = Country  (a member of a  subset of Latin American 
countries)
t = Year  (from 1951 to 1999)
RGDP = Annual growth rate of  Real Gross Domestic Product 
per capita
I = Coefficient of private investment (Priv. Inv/GDP) 
G = Coefficient of Central government expenditure
 (Gov. Consumption /GDP)     
OPEN = Trade coefficient ( (Exports+Imports)/ GDP)
INFLATION = Annual change in consumer price index
POPGROWTH = Growth rate of population
LRGPL50 = Log of  Real GDP per capita in 1950
LNSECEN60 = Log of Secondary Education Enrollment rate 
in 1960
BLACKMP =  Black market premium of the exchange rate
DEMOCRACY = An index for democracy  [0,1,…10].
RIOTS = Number of riots involving more that 100 people. 
CONSTCH = Changes made to the Constitution 
ε= random error    
Several considerations have to be made with respect to the 
specification of the model: 
1) We were  not able to include some political and institutional 
variables. For example an index of business risk was not 
included because it is only available from private sources at a 
specific price. In addition, an index for the rule of law, which 
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is important for our model, is not available in time series; it 
is only useful for cross-country studies (Knack, 1996). 
2) There has been enough empirical evidence of the endogeneity 
of private investment (I) and an obvious solution for this 
problem is the use of instrumental variables. Barro (1997) 
has used different specifications to solve this issue with 
some positive results in cross-country studies. The problem, 
however, is that  for this variable there is a lack of good 
instruments. Moreover, in pooled and cross time series, one 
runs into software limitations to handle the problem8.
3) OPEN tries to reflect the role of trade in development; 
INFLATION tells us something about the macro-stability 
conditions of the economy, and it is expected to be harmful 
for economic growth; and POPGROWTH has been assumed 
to be negative for economic growth. 
4) LRGPL50 and LNSECEN60 are control variables for the initial 
levels of GDP and education. These variables are necessary 
to guarantee conditional convergence. We expect β to be 
negative  (the higher the initial level of output and education, 
the closer it is the economy from the steady-state growth 
rate).
5) BLACKMP accounts for exchange control systems, 
inefficiencies and corruption in the trade system of the 
economy. It picks some of the institutional problems at an 
economic level.
6) DEMOCRACY is an important index that many scholars have 
found relevant for economic growth. Barro (1996a, 1997) 
finds a quadratic expression for democracy that is explored 
in this paper. The idea is that democracy is good for growth 
8  Obviously the code would result very complicated. This issue is left for further 
research.
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but excessive democracy can also hinder economic growth 
(Barro 1996a, 1997). See above for other arguments. 
7) RIOTS and CONSTCH were included to address some 
problems of institutional instability.
8) Another limitation of the model is that it was impossible 
to obtain consistent and continuous data for a proxy for 
investment in human capital, such as Expenditure in 
Education/GDP.
Given the structure assumed for ε
it
, we used two estimation 
procedures:
a) The Parks method assumes a first-order autoregressive 
structure with contemporaneous correlations between the 
cross sections. The errors can be heteroskedastic within the 
same cross section, contemporaneously correlated across 
sections within the same time observation, and follow an AR 
(1) process.
Analytically, 
E (ε2
it
) = σ
it
 
E (ε
ijεεij) = σij  
ε
ij
 = ρ
i
ε
i,t–1 
+µ
it
 
b) The Fuller and Batesse method is basically the panel-error 
component model, where the disturbance is formed by three 
independent components, one associated with time, another 
with the cross sectional unit, and the third varying in both 
dimensions9. Hence, ε
it 
= µ
i
 + υ
t
 + ω
it
 where ε, µ, ω follows 
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a normal distribution η (0, σ ) with the classical assumptions, 
and are independently distributed.
The usage of the error component model derived from 
criticisms of the Park method because of bias in standard errors 
and t-statistics in the case of small samples (Beck and Katz, 1995). 
Both methods are used here.  
IV.  THE DATA
The data was taken from different sources: a) For the period 1950-
1992, for a set of variables such as OPEN, I, G, the data was taken 
from the Penn World Tables (Summers and Heston, 1991). The 
information was downloaded from the Center for International 
Development at Harvard University10.  The Real GDP per capita is 
given in US dollars of 1985 based on international prices (Laspeyres 
Index). RGDP was calculated taking differences of the logs. b.) 
For the period 1993-1999 the information was completed using 
the database of Easterly and Sewadeh at the World Bank11, which 
provides broad information on Macro-Time Series, Micro-Time 
Series, Government Finance and Social indicators. Information on 
education, population and BPM was also taken from there. 
Initially the intention was to include all countries of Latin 
America, but the information for most of the Caribbean islands was 
incomplete. Only Haiti and the Dominican Republic remained. Cuba 
was excluded because there is no information at all. Hence, our final 
sample was reduced to continental countries, excluding Belize and 
9  An explanation of both methods can be seen in K-Menta, J. (1986). Ch.12.
10  The precise site is http://paradocs.pols.columbia.edu/
11  This data base can be seen at http://www.worldbank.org/research/growth/
GDNdata.htm
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Guyana, which  also presented information problems. At the end, we 
ended up with 17 countries, covering 49 years (See Appendix).
Some information for specific years was incomplete. We had to 
calculate some of the data by using several issues of the International 
Financial Statistics of the IMF, some of them from the 50s or the end 
of the 90s, calculations were made to estimate missing values. 
The political variables presented a major obstacle. Most of this 
information is given for a few years, which is useful for cross-country 
studies but not for pooled cross-country analysis. We selected the 
variables available and discarded the ones that lacked consistency. 
Those that  we kept were taken from the database of the Polity 
IV-Project of the CIDCM of the University of Maryland12, created 
by Marshall and Jaggers. Within these we included the index of 
democracy as a measure of the degree of civil rights and political 
liberties present in a country. 
The information for the rest of the political variables was taken 
from Easterly and Levine, also from the Center of International 
Development (CID) at Harvard University.  Although there seems 
to be a database for an index of Rule of Law and for Business Risk 
Indicators, we did not include it because of its cost. We acknowledge 
this to be an important limitation for our project and hope to be 
able to use this database in the future.  
V.  ECONOMETRIC RESULTS
The model defined in (3) was run, using the TSCS procedure in 
SAS. Different specifications were explored, and different time 
periods were used.  The first set of models was run for the whole 
period from 1951 to 1999.  The second model was run only for the 
period 1980-1999 using the same variables from which we were 
12  See http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/polity/
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able to get all the information needed; the idea was to check for 
changes in the final period due to the extensive time period of the 
first model. Finally, a third model was run, for the period 1961-
1989, based on the availability of the variables.
A.  MODEL 1 (1951-1999)
Dependent Variable: GRGDP GRGDP
Estimation Method Fuller
Number of Cross Sections      17
Time Series Length                 49
Fit Statistics
SSE 1.5815 DFE 82
MSE 0.0019 Root MSE 0.0438
R-Square 0.0879
Variance Component Estimates
Variance Component for Cross Sections 0.000021
Variance Component for Time Series 0.000289
Variance Component for Error  0.001914
Hausman Test for  Random Effects:
DF    m Value    Pr > m
7      13.65    0.0577
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PARAMETER ESTIMATES
MODEL 1 – Estimation Method Fuller
1951-1999
Variable DF
Standard 
Estimate
Error t Value Pr > |t|
Intercept 1 0.080436 0.0425 1.89 0.0585
I 1 0.002155 0.000341 6.32 <.0001
G 1 -0.00088 0.000390 -2.26 0.0242
OPEN 1 -0.00008 0.000064 -1.24 0.2137
INFLATION 1 -9.05E-6 2.258E-6 -4.01 <.0001
POPGROWT 1 0.001616 0.00296 0.55 0.5851
LRGDPL50 1 -0.01422 0.00637 -2.23 0.2458
LNSECENR60 1 0.007871 0.00672 1.17 0.2420
Estimation Method: Parks
Fit Statistics
SSE             824.5709     DFE 825
MSE            0.9995     Root MSE 0.9997
R-Square         0.0775
                                     
PARAMETER ESTIMATES
MODEL 1 – Estimation Method Parks
1951-1999
Variable DF
Standard 
Estimate
Error T Value Pr > |t|
Intercept 1 0.059669 0.0402 1.48 0.1381
I 1 0.00202 0.000309 6.54 <.0001
G 1 -0.00085 0.000411 -2.07 0.0384
OPEN 1 -0.00009 0.000050 -1.75 0.0808
INFLATION 1 -5.92E-6 2.214E-6 -2.67 0.0077
POPGROWTH 1 0.002436 0.00238 1.02 0.3057
LRGDPL50 1 -0.01222 0.00598 -2.04 0.0412
LNSECENR60 1 0.009228 0.00553 1.67 0.0953
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These results clearly show that I (private investment/GDP) 
was very significant; even though it is affected by problems of 
endogeneity. One is not sure if investment is driving growth or 
the other way around. G (government consumption/GDP) was sig-
nificant with the expected sign. OPEN shows the wrong sign and  is 
not significant using Fuller. POPGROWTH was not important and 
the initial level of GDP per capita is significant with the expected 
sign (negative). Except for OPEN, the results are consistent with 
the growth literature. The control variable for education was not 
significant. Inflation rates were significant and gave the correct sign 
(negative). 
In the next specification we include DEMOCRACY as an in-
dependent variable. A quadratic expression following Barro (1997) 
is explored.
Estimation Method Fuller
 R-Square 0.0887
 Variance Component for Cross Sections 0.000027
 Variance Component for Time Series          0.000287
 Variance Component for Error                     0.001911
PARAMETER ESTIMATES
MODEL WITH DEMOCRACY
ESTIMATION METHOD FULLER
Variable DF
Standard 
Estimate
Error T Value Pr > |t|
Intercept 1 0.079875 0.0440 1.82 0.0696
I 1 0.002218 0.000347 6.39 <.0001
G 1 -0.00086 0.000395 -2.17 0.0306
OPEN 1 -0.00008 0.000065 -1.30 0.1945
INFLATION 1 -9.13E-6 2.264E-6 -4.03 <.0001
POPGROWTH 1 0.001488 0.00304 0.49 0.6248
LRGDPL50 1 -0.01398 0.00661 -2.12 0.0347
LNSECENR60 1 0.006424 0.00719 0.89 0.3721
DEMOCRACY 1 0.000423 0.000540 0.78 0.4341
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Estimation Method: Parks
R-Square          0.0778                          
PARAMETER ESTIMATE
MODEL WITH DEMOCRACY
ESTIMATION METHOD PARKS
                                         
Variable DF 
Standard 
Estimate
Error  t Value  Pr > |t|
 Intercept 1 0.057994 0.0405 1.43 0.1529
 I 1 0.002036 0.000312 6.53 <.0001
G 1 -0.00082 0.000415 -1.99 0.0474
OPEN 1 -0.00009 0.000050 -1.81  0.0700
INFLATION 1 -5.99E-6 2.203E-6 -2.72 0.0067
POPGROWTH 1 0.002539 0.00248 1.02 0.3061
LRGDPL50 1 -0.01201 0.00603 -1.99 0.0467
LNSECENR60 1 0.008909 0.00589 1.51 0.1308
DEMOCRACY 1 0.000103 0.000434 0.24 0.8130
Now, we explore the use of a quadratic expression for DE-
MOCRACY:
Fuller and Battese Method Estimation
SSE 1.5733 DFE 823
MSE 0.0019 Root MSE 0.0437
 R-Square 0.0900
Variance Component Estimate
Variance Component for Cross Sections     0.000031
Variance Component for Time Series 0.000293
Variance Component for Error 0.0019
DF m Value Pr > m
9 16.83 0.0515
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PARAMETER ESTIMATES
MODEL WITH QUADRATIC EXPRESSION FOR DEMOCRACY
ESTIMATION METHOD FULLER AND BATTASE
Variable DF 
Standard 
Estimate
Error t Value Pr > |t|
Intercept 1 0.08158 0.0451 1.81 0.0707
I_ 1 0.002349 0.000363 6.47 <.000
G_ 1 -0.00084 0.000397 -2.11 0.0353
OPEN 1 -0.00009 0.000066 -1.34 0.1808
 INFLATION 1 -9.08E-6 2.264E-6 -4.01 <.0001
POPGROWTH 1 0.001032 0.00313 0.33 0.7415
LRGDPL50 1 -0.01355 0.00678 -2.00 0.0460
LNSECENR60 1 0.004519 0.00756 0.60 0.5499 
DEMOCRACY 1 -0.00144 0.00192 -0.75 0.4524
DEM2 1 0.000224 0.000218 1.03 0.3049
                                      
Parks Method Estimation
SSE             822.7697     DFE                  823
MSE            0.9997     Root MSE        0.9999
R-Square          0.0773
PARAMETER ESTIMATES
MODEL WITH QUADRATIC EXPRESSION FOR DEMOCRACY
ESTIMATION METHOD PARKS
Variable DF 
Standard 
Estimate
Error t Value Pr > |t|
Intercept 1 0.05579 0.0410 1.36 0.1735 
I_ 1 0.002075 0.000323 6.42 <.0001
G_ 1 -0.0008 0.000417 -1.92 0.0558
OPEN 1 -0.00009 0.000049 -1.84 0.0657
 INFLATION 1 -5.83E-6 2.197E-6 -2.65 0.0081
POPGROWTH 1 0.002473 0.00259 0.95 0.3408
LRGDPL50 1 -0.01131 0.00611 -1.85 0.0644
LNSECENR60 1 0.007679 0.00633 1.21 0.2257
DEMOCRACY 1 -0.00099 0.00162 -0.61 0.5392
DEM2 1 0.000128 0.000176 0.73 0.4666 
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From these two tables we may deduce that none of the 
specifications of DEMOCRACY seems to play a role in economic 
growth, worsening the result for the quadratic specification. This 
result is not a surprise. From several studies, it has been found that 
a quadratic behavior of Democracy is only valid in cross-country 
studies all over the world, where you have more variation in the 
variables Growth and Democracy. This is not the case for Latin 
America, where there are similarities in the evolution of Democracy 
and one cannot expect any kind of quadratic expression.  Moreover, 
a Lagrange Multiplier test was performed to check the relevance of 
DEM2, giving negative results13. In addition, a dummy variable was 
used for bigger countries such as Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, and 
the results were not significant. Using Parks, the t-statistic of the 
dummy was 1.35, and as expected with Fuller, it was .22.
B.  MODEL 2 (1980-1999)
Model 1 was run for the period 1980-1999. For model 2 we include 
BLACKMP, with the purpose of exploring these parameters for 
a different period of analysis, especially, when Latin America 
was affected by the debt-crisis and orthodox policies began to be 
applied. 
The results were the following:
Estimation Method             Fuller
Number of Cross Sections 17
Time Series Length   20
SSE               0.6751 DFE 330
MSE             0.0020 Root MSE 0.0452
R-Square        0.1002
13  For both Fuller and Parks the Lagrange Multiplier was 2.6389 and 1.020, 
respectively. Both  are less than 95),.1(χ  =3.841
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Variance Component for Cross Sections 0.000057
Variance Component for Time Series 0.000351
Variance Component for Error                  0.002028
Hausman Test for  Random Effects
DF m Value Pr > m
7 9.91 0.1939
                             
Estimation Method Park
PARAMETER ESTIMATES
MODEL 2 - ESTIMATION METHOD FULLER
Variable DF 
Standard   
Estimate
Error t Value Pr > |t|
Intercept 1  0.138712 0.0899 1.54 0.1238
I_ 1 0.000967 0.000387 2.50 0.0129
G_ 1 -0.00103 0.000588 -1.76 0.0796
OPEN 1 -0.00003 0.000081 -0.36 0.7173
 INFLATION 1 -9.61E-6 2.366E-6 -4.06 <.0001
POPGROWTH 1 -0.00823 0.00578 -1.42 0.1557
LRGDPL80 1 -0.01811 0.00893 -2.03 0.0435
LNSECENR80 1 0.005808 0.0108 0.54 0.5908
DEMOCRAC 1 0.002356 0.000919 2.56 0.0108
BLACKMP 1 1.63E-7 9.887E-7 0.16 0.8691
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 Estimation Method Park      
PARAMETER ESTIMATES
MODEL 2 - ESTIMATION METHOD PARK
Variable DF 
Standard   
Estimate
Error t Value Pr > |t|
Intercept 1 0.085244 0.0279 3.06 0.0024 
I_ 1 0.001183 0.000099 11.93 <.0001
G_ 1 -0.00134 0.000240 -5.58 <.0001
OPEN 1 0.000082 0.000025 3.27 0.0012
 INFLATION 1 -8.72E-6 7.503E-7 -11.62 <.0001
POPGROWTH 1 -0.00917 0.00200 -4.59 <.0001
LRGDPL80 1 -0.01233 0.00349 -3.53 0.0005
LNSECENR80 1 0.006478 0.00427 1.52 0.1304
DEMOCRAC 1 0.002681 0.000361 7.42 <.0001
BLACKMP 1 1.076E-6 6.126E-7 1.76 0.0800 
As usual, I, G, INFLATION, and LRGDPL80 are significant. 
In Park, trade is now more relevant, as are Democracy, 
POPGROWTH and BLACKMP (with the wrong sign). This seems 
to suggest that imposing an AR (1) structure in the random error 
makes a difference, compared with Fuller.  However, due to the 
fact that the sample is smaller compared with Model 1, we prefer 
the Fuller estimates.
C.  MODEL 3 (1961-1989)
The idea here is to include a set of additional political variables for 
which we were able to find information. One country was excluded 
because of data limitations. The results were the following:
Estimation Method Fuller
Number of Cross Sections 6
Time Series Length  29
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R-Square          0.1454
Variance Component for Cross Sections 0.000026
Variance Component for Time Series 0.000341
Variance Component for Error 0.001969
Hausman Test for Random Effects
DF m Value Pr > m
8       16.51     0.0357 
PARAMETER ESTIMATES
MODEL 3 - ESTIMATION METHOD FULLER
Variable DF 
Standard   
Estimate
Error t Value
Pr > |t| 
Label
Intercept 1 0.174753 0.0529 3.30 0.0010
I_ 1 0.00307 0.000491 6.26 <.0001
G_ 1 -0.00162 0.000498 -3.24 0.0013
OPEN 1 -0.00006 0.000160 -0.39 0.6978
 INFLATION 1 -9.69E-6 2.796E-6 -3.47 0.0006
POPGROWTH 1 -0.0021 0.00452 -0.47 0.6417
LRGDPL61 1 -0.02697 0.00804 -3.35 0.0009
LNSECENR60 1 0.00992 0.0101 0.98 0.3273
DEMOCRACY 1 0.00064 0.000712 0.90 0.3689
RIOTS 1 0.000269 0.00119 0.23 0.8214
CONSTCH 1 -0.01366 0.0112 -1.22 0.2233
Estimation Method: Park
SSE 452.1537 DFE 453
MSE 0.9981 Root MSE 0.9991
R-Square      0.262
revista de economía del caribe nº1 (2008) págs. 46-77[70]
growth and institutions in latin america: 
a pooled and cross-time series analysis (1951-1999)*
PARAMETER ESTIMATES
MODEL 3 - ESTIMATION METHOD PARKS
Variable DF 
Standard   
Estimate
Error t Value Pr > |t| 
Intercept 1 0.155699 0.0276 5.65 <.0001
I_ 1 0.003369 0.000363 9.28 <.0001
G_ 1 -0.00189 0.000456 -4.13 <.0001
OPEN 1 -0.00009 0.000133 -0.64 0.5199
 INFLATION 1 -6.26E-6 1.593E-6 -3.93 <.0001
POPGROWTH 1 0.001453 0.00319 0.45 0.6494
LRGDPL61 1 -0.02616 0.00483 -5.42 <.0001
LNSECENR60 1 0.00955 0.00780 1.23 0.2212
DEMOCRACY 1 0.000272 0.000461 0.59 0.5566
RIOTS 1 0.001863 0.000765 2.43 0.0153
CONSTCH 1 -0.03058 0.0110 -2.78 0.0056
From the results presented above we deduce that, again, I, 
G, INFLATION, LRGDPL61 are significant. Democracy is not 
significant, and Riots is significant only in Parks with the wrong 
sign. Constitutional changes seem to be more significant with the 
correct sign. 
D.  MODEL 4 (1984-1998)
Our last model includes additional institutional variables not 
included in the previous specifications due to limitations in the data 
set.  However,  these additional variables could be included only for 
the period 1984-1998 because the available data existed only for this 
time  period14. The three new variables were:
14  Our acknowledgments to Danni Rodrik of the University of Harvard who 
diligently helped us with this data base obtained form the World Bank. 
International Risk Country Guide, 2002.
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CORRUPTION  (SCALE 0-6, where 0 represents the higher 
risk)
LAW AND ORDER TRADITION (0-6, where 0 is the higher 
risk)
QUALITY OF BUREAUCRACY  (0-6, where 0 is the higher 
risk).
Estimation Method: Fuller
SSE 0.3470 DFE 228
MSE 0.0015 Root MSE 0.0390
R-Square 0.2304
PARAMETER ESTIMATES
Variable DF 
Standard   
Estimate
Error t Value Pr > |t| 
Intercept 1 0.271529 0.0968 2.80 0.0055
I_ 1 0.002682 0.000729 3.68 0.0003
G_ 1 -0.00092 0.000573 -1.61 0.1081
OPEN 1 -0.0001 0.000078 -1.22 0.2228
 INFLATION 1 -9.6E-6 2.067E-6 -4.64 <.0001
POPGROWTH 1 -0.02105 0.00609 -3.46 0.0006
LRGDPL80 1 -0.02459 0.00976 -2.52 0.0124
LNSECENR80 1 -0.0149 0.0101 -1.47 0.1426
DEMOCRACY 1 0.001875 0.00102 1.83 0.0686
CORRUP 1 0.000113 0.00336 0.03 0.9732
LAW 1 0.005396 0.00351 1.54 0.1259
BUREACR 1 -0.00247 0.00392 -0.63 0.5288
Estimation Method :Parks 
SSE 221.1632 DFE 228
MSE 0.9700 Root MSE 0.9849
R-Square 0.6979
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PARAMETER ESTIMATES
Variable DF 
Standard   
Estimate
Error t Value Pr > |t| 
Intercept 1 0.264546 0.0519 5.10 <.0001
I_ 1 0.002678 0.000243 11.02 <.0001
G_ 1 -0.00119 0.000233 -5.09 <.0001 
OPEN 1 -0.00011 0.000024 -4.57 <.0001
 INFLATION 1 -8.85E-6 8.925E-7 -9.92 <.0001
POPGROWTH 1 -0.02111 0.00184 -11.44 <.0001
LRGDPL80 1 -0.02304 0.00767 -3.01 0.0029
LNSECENR80 1 -0.01589 0.00585 -2.72 0.0071
DEMOCRACY 1 0.002461 0.000461 5.34 <.0001
CORRUP 1 0.000154 0.00113 0.14 0.8922
LAW 1 0.006971 0.00115 6.08 <.0001
BUREACR 1 -0.00369 0.00121 -3.05 0.0026
The above results   are very consistent with many studies. 
Investment is highly significant with the correct sign, although 
affected by endogeneity. Public consumption expenditure (G) 
seems to harm economic growth.  External trade does not seem to 
favor economic growth, a result contrary to standard neoclassical 
economics theory. Inflation and population growth hinder economic 
growth. The control level variables (Real GDP levels and human 
capital endowments) are significant with the correct sign. Now, the 
variables reflecting institutional arrangements such as democracy 
and rule of law seem to favor economic growth.  Corruption does 
not appear to be relevant and the quality of public bureaucracy has 
the wrong sign.  
These results are much better compared with previous 
models, indicating the fact that if social research continues to build 
data sets reflecting the role of institutions, the results are going to 
improve. During the last twenty years of the twentieth century 
economic growth of Latin American countries  seems to be more 
affected by institutional variables.
revista de economía del caribe nº1 (2008) págs. 46-77 [73]
Jairo Parada C., Alexandra García I.
VI.  CONCLUSIONS
 
Some authors claim that the use of pooled cross time series analysis 
does not add much to the cross sectional analysis due to the influence 
of the business cycle in the data, although this problem is eliminated 
using averages of the variables in cross sectional analysis (Temple, 
133). However, we argue that business cycles in developing nations 
are somewhat different from those in developed ones, which make 
those developing countries more affected by financial shocks and 
other problems. Moreover, this analysis will be stronger and richer, 
if we used all the information that complete time series can provide 
in panel data analysis.
In general, the results of this exercise for the case of Latin 
American seem to point out several conclusions. First, it is necessary 
to generate and improve the quality of social, institutional and political 
indicators in order to be able to capture the role of institutions in 
growth.  The evidence obtained is somewhat  weak, but not because 
the institutions are not there, playing an important role, but because 
many important variables as rule of law and business risk indicators 
as well as other relevant political variables as internal security, and 
political culture, were not included for the total period, 
In addition, the hypothesis of conditional convergence is 
verified in all the regressions for the case of Latin America. The 
evidence about human capital regarding this convergence is weaker, 
though more solid for the last two decades of the twentieth century. 
Investment is the driving variable of growth and government 
consumption expenditure is harmful for economic growth.  The 
evidence for open trade policies is not conclusive, contrary to what 
orthodox economic analysis assumes. 
Also, there is no conclusive evidence that population growth 
is harmful for economic growth. Black market premiums seem to be 
inappropriate indicator of the inefficiency of government policies. 
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As for democracy, during the whole period it does not seem 
to be very important for economic growth. However, this does 
not mean that it does not play a role. We believe that this finding is 
affected by the difficulty in isolating its components with respect 
to the other variables. Contrary to what other researchers have 
found (Temple, 147), we did not find an important role for political 
instability in economic growth in the case of Latin America. But, on 
the other hand, continuous constitutional changes through political 
reforms or acts can be harmful for economic growth. During the 
last two decades, democracy and the rule of law seem to play a 
positive role.
In sum, there is still much to be done concerning the role of 
institutions in economic growth, as we were not able to determine a 
clear institutional effect because of the limitations of data resources. 
We encourage researchers to share and contribute to the discipline 
by making critical data available to the academic community, 
especially to scholars from developing countries where academic 
institutions have limited resources for research and development.
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APPENDIX
Latin American Countries included in the sample
Argentina Colombia México           
Paraguay Dominican Republic Bolivia         
Costa Rica Nicaragua El Salvador
Brazil Ecuador Panamá           
Uruguay Chile Honduras           
Perú Venezuela     
